

1961

Speeches, Foreign Aid

Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

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8/18/61

STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

FOREIGN AID -- 1961

Mr. President:

We are now on the verge of a final vote on the foreign aid program. The bill, in its present form, is substantially that which was reported by the Committee. I think it is a good bill which, if it is generally sustained in House, points the way to significant improvement in the effectiveness of the aid-program and the saving of public funds on this enterprise in the years ahead.

However, I think we should bear in mind that, with this bill, we will have merely paved the way. On other occasions we have thought that we had set the course for major improvement only to discover later that little had changed. In point of fact, the major action we have taken, that is, the new method of long-range financing upon which so much of the hope for emendation is based, affects directly only a segment of the aid-program. It affects only loans to other nations which are repayable to us. I would caution, therefore, against expecting very much from the change which we have made in this aspect of the program unless there are far-reaching changes in other aspects. Of this aid-authorization, \$1.2 billion is involved in the Development Loan Fund. The difficulties of the aid-program, in the past, have rarely been associated with loans but rather with grants which form the major part of this \$4 billion dollar aid-bill--the part which is not repayable, the

part for which we shall go on making annual appropriations. The basic problems of the aid-program, Mr. President, go much deeper than how we may finance lending operations. They go largely to the grant aspect of this program.

I base this observation, Mr. President, on years of participation in Committee in hearings on Foreign Aid. I have watched old spokesmen for the program go and new spokesmen arrive-- Republicans and Democrats both. I have listened to any number of Presidential messages and debates on this subject. I have inquired in depth into the program in special and subcommittee study, as one Senator trying to do his job.

As the Senate knows, I have been critical of foreign aid for a long time. I remain critical. I remain critical even though the legislation this year is sponsored by an administration of my own party.

I remain critical not because improvement cannot flow from the revisions in the Act which have been engineered by the Committee on Foreign Relations. I remain critical because the following conclusion has become steadily more inescapable over the years: The Congress can alter this program drastically or abolish it with a meat-ax but no matter how this Act is drawn or redrawn, legislation can never provide more than a small part of a discriminating answer

to the difficulties of foreign aid. What matters far more in finding that kind of answer is how the program is fitted into our foreign policies and how effective those policies are in the first place. What matters far more is how the aid-program is carried out in the enormous detail of administration, day in and day out, month in and month out, year in and year out.

In these terms, Mr. President, there is not yet an assurance of a new approach to foreign aid. There is not yet an assurance that foreign aid will be shaped to the purposes of foreign policy rather than continue as a kind of soporific for our diplomacy. There is not yet an assurance that the realistic possibilities of aid will be separated from the jumble of illusory expectations and that these possibilities alone will be pursued with vigor and dispatch. There is not yet an assurance that the complex, costly, cumbersome over-administration of the program will be made more effective.

There is not yet assurance on any of these points for the simple reason that performance alone, not words, can provide such assurance. And, at this point in a new administration there can only be the words, the promise that changes--essential changes--will be made in foreign aid, not the performance itself. That promise, indeed, is to be found in the President's message. It is to be found in the informed efforts of the Committee on Foreign Relations to give the President the kind of legislation which he must have to bring about the essential changes.

On the basis of that promise, I ~~intend to~~ support fully the legislation which the Committee has reported.

In all frankness, a promise of change, alone, might not have been sufficient to persuade me to this position except in present circumstances. Does the Senator from Montana support it, then, only because he happens to be Majority Leader? Is he under some obligation to support it because he is speaking for the Administration in the Senate? As the Senate knows, I have had occasion recently to speak not as Majority Leader but as a Senator from Montana, on the Berlin question. I should not hesitate to speak again in that same capacity on this matter or any other, if it seemed to me necessary to do so.

No, Mr. President, I support this measure not because I happen to be Majority Leader. I support it because I believe an aid-program, altered in concept and in administration, is vital to the security and welfare of the nation. And it should be noted, Mr. President, that the word, vital, does not appear very frequently in my remarks in the Senate.

If I am prepared to support this program on the promise of change rather than insisting upon the actuality of change, it is because two decades of participation have taught me something of the operations of this government. Every experienced member of this body knows that an orderly alteration in an undertaking of the magnitude and complexity

of the aid-program is not going to be brought about in six months or a year. That is the case no matter how far-sighted or determined may be the political leadership of this Administration or any other.

The simple truth is that the aid-program which was presented to Congress this year is not significantly different in substance from that of the previous year, despite the change in party shingles on the door of the Executive Branch. It is different only in its promise of change, and that is the only way in which it can be different at this time. The simple truth is that the preponderant detail of this year's program was drawn up last year under the last Administration and by essentially the same permanent civil and military officials.

This simple truth must be noted, Mr. President, not in criticism of the previous Administration nor of the incumbent Administration nor of the permanent functionaries. This simple truth must be noted because we must call the cards honestly if we are to recast the aid program so that it will indeed serve the interests of the nation more effectively.

What this simple truth means is that the previous Administration recognized and the present Administration has confirmed, on an initial examination of the state of foreign relations, that the interests of the nation in the world require the aid-program to continue.

My own view is that there is a second truth which we need to recognize.
It is that the aid-program must continue but in an altered form, as
countless informed critics--many in this body--have noted time and
again. And to these two observations, I would add a third: The
alterations in the aid-program, if they are to safeguard rather than
disrupt the interests of the nation, can only be promised at this time
of the new Administration. If they were more than promised, if they
were changes signed, sealed and delivered at this point, they would
probably be either insignificant changes or devastating changes.

Believe me, Mr. President, no member of this body is more convinced than the Senator from Montana--the Majority Leader--of the need for change in the aid-program. I am not unaware of the high content of futility, confusion, inertia, waste and worse which has existed in this program for a long time.

It is understandable that some, seeing these shortcomings, year after year, are moved to apply this year, the drastic remedy of abolition. On this ground, there will undoubtedly be votes cast against final passage of the bill.

And there will be others who will see only the expenditure abroad of three or four billions of the tax-payers money. They will be moved to opposition on this ground, their opposition deepened by a scattering of examples of wasteful or luxurious undertakings in this country or that abroad, financed by the aid-program. They will be appalled and,

properly so, particularly as they contrast examples of extravagance abroad with the backlog of unfilled needs at home or the deficit in the budget. And they, too, will be moved to vote against the oil on final passage.

That, of course, is the privilege of every Senator, to vote against this oil.

In all honesty, Mr. President, I should like nothing more than to be able to tell the citizens of my state and the nation that I had just voted to cut three or four billions of spending out of the budget. Even more, Mr. President, I should like to be able to tell them that I had performed this feat without affecting adversely a single Federal service to any state.

I could do that, Mr. President, if I cast a vote against the foreign aid bill. It would not be an untruth. It would be, rather, a fraction of the truth. I would not have told the whole story. I would have to add, if I wished to tell the whole story, that I had voted to save these three or four billion dollars on foreign aid at the gravest risk to the security of the nation. I would have to tell them that in voting against foreign aid, I had also voted to bring about drastic upheavals in South Korea, in South Viet Nam, in Formosa, in Turkey, in Iran and Bolivia and, at least the gravest of political difficulties in Thailand, Pakistan, Spain and Greece and other nations. I would have to tell them

that I had created a situation whereby there would be no choice but to watch many of these situations collapse or to send United States combat forces into them to try to shore them up.

Nor would that yet be the whole truth. I should have to add, Mr. President, that I had voted for catastrophic economic dislocations and famine, disease and pestilence in many free nations and, also, for a world-wide financial panic whose effects would be most acutely felt in Japan and Western Europe but whose repercussions would reach even into the United States.

Finally, I would have to tell the citizens of my state and the nation that I had voted to close American military bases in many parts of the world and to undermine the whole system of alliances by which, for a decade or more, we have sought to defend the security of the nation and to keep open the prospects for freedom in peace in large areas of the world.

And after having listed all these consequences of my vote against this bill, I would still have to admit that I had not told quite the whole story. A postscript would be necessary. I would have to say that I acted to bring about these drastic consequences at a time when a new Administration was just beginning to grasp the reins of direction over the sprawling bureaucracy of this government, at a time when this new Administration was confronted with a whole series of ripening international crises building even at this very moment towards an apex at Berlin.

It might be, Mr. President, that I would not wish to burden the citizens of the nation with this long and vexatious account of the consequences of my vote against foreign aid. It might be that I would find no point in stuffing them with these troublesome facts of international life in our times. In that case, Mr. President, I could save their time and mine, spare their nerves and mine, if I told them merely that I had saved them three or four billion by my vote on foreign aid, and then, did my part for the security of the nation by insisting that the President use no diplomacy whatsoever but simply stand still at Berlin and stop the communists wherever they appeared, whether in Laos, South Viet Nam, the Congo or Patagonia.

Exaggeration, Mr. President? I do not think so. Is there anyone in this body who does not believe that the most drastic political consequences would flow from a sudden cessation of grants of aid to Korea, Viet Nam, Formosa, Turkey, Iran, Bolivia, Thailand, Pakistan, Spain and Greece? And is the Senate not aware that of the total of \$3 billion-odd in grants of military and economic assistance, originally sought in this legislation by the Executive Branch, \$1.5 billions, was earmarked for just these ten nations while the remainder of the grants was scattered in relatively small amounts among more than 50 other nations?

I shall not play upon the fears of the Senate by saying that all these countries will go to the Communists if we do not pass this measure.

The Senate can be assured, however, that in some instances, it is no idle fear. What I do say to the Senate is that these 10 nations, and a few others are the crux of the grant aspect of this program. It is these nations which have developed a direct and heavy dependence upon American aid. It is these nations which would be affected to their very vitals by sudden termination of the program. What I do say to the Senate is that the entire position of these nations and their relationship with the United States would undergo a sudden and incalculable change if this bill were not passed.

What kind of make-believe world are we living in if we can lead ourselves to believe that the situation, at least in the 10 nations I have enumerated, would not alter virtually overnight and our relations with them turn upside down if we were to withdraw the king-pin of aid? And what is a vote against this bill but a vote to withdraw the king-pin?

Some will see clearly these consequences. But they will assert that it is better to face the collapse of the situations and other world-wide repercussions rather than to go on with this unsatisfactory device of aid and the continued drain on our resources which it entails. I respect the honesty of that position, Mr. President, but I most respectfully disagree with it. I disagree with it because I do not believe this nation can long anchor its life of freedom and plenty in a vast sea of hopeless human misery, political chaos and deepening tyranny. In the world which we now know, Mr. President, a world

of the governments are
in which the greater part is still either allied with us, friendly or,
at worst, indifferent, we are compelled to military expenditures
on our own armed forces which consume 60 percent of the budget
of this government, *about \$50 billion* ~~\$45 billion~~ annually. What would that percentage
be, Mr. President, in a world in which the greater part were allied
elsewhere, hostile or, at best, indifferent? Eighty percent of the
budget? 90 percent? How many billions, then, for defense, Mr. President,
\$60 billions? \$70 billions? \$80 billions? Living day in and day out
in a military camp, mobilized at constant readiness for an attack
upon us, how far would we ourselves have moved from freedom? And
what, then, of the spending in Washington? Spending, not for the
unemployed or for the aged or for schools or for roads or for the
countless other human needs of this nation; but spending for the
dubious privilege of maintaining an uncertain foothold on the edge
of a hostile world?

No, Mr. President, I cannot see that the answer to the patent shortcomings of the aid-program lies in the drastic surgery of total excision. I cannot see it, for I see as the only alternative in present international circumstances something approaching a garrison State in this nation. If there is any other alternative, it seems to me that it is a responsibility on the part of those who advocate this remedy to enlighten those of us who do not.

May I say that I can understand the concern of some Members who are persuaded to this solution of abolition of aid. I share the

concern without endorsing the solution. And I stress to the Senate that there are grounds, enormous grounds for concern in the manner in which the aid-program has unfolded in recent years.

Who in this body should not feel concern when in country after country, after years of this program since the Marshall Plan, grants of aid from this nation remain the critical factor in maintaining internal stability, and the end of this process is not yet in sight?

We use words loosely, Mr. President, if we call this condition by any name other than a form of dependency. And it is not in the interests of this nation or freedom that any other nation remain indefinitely in a state of dependency on aid-grants from the United States. It is not in the interests of the peoples of the recipient nations.

Who in this body should not feel concern when hundreds of millions of aid goes to governments which have not met or are unwilling to meet honest tests of public acceptance in their own countries? Who in this body should not feel concern when the gap between the luxurious life of the few in and around governments and the poverty-stricken life of the millions in aid-receiving nations does not begin to close and, all too frequently, the beneficial impact of the bulk of our assistance is limited to the few?

Who in this body should not feel concern at the manner in which the military aid program has developed? In theory, military aid ought to be bound up directly with our own defense needs. At least,

it began that way, Mr. President. It began with what seems to me to have been a reasonable strategic relationship with free nations involved in the defense of the Atlantic region, and with certain key countries elsewhere--a total of perhaps 15 or 20 nations at the outside. But military aid during the last few years has sprawled into about 50 nations and, often, brought in its wake the need for massive infusions of economic grants to support military establishments, built and sustained by military aid. It has sprawled in, with all the costly trappings of bureaucracy and it has immersed us inevitably in the internal affairs of nation after nation whose connection with our military defense is often vague or non-existent.

From a concept of close strategic relationship with our defense, military aid has now moved to an enlarged base of justification which equates the maintenance of internal stability in nations almost everywhere on the globe with our security. That, Mr. President, in my opinion, is a most dangerous doctrine, particularly in nations where the gross and long-standing neglect of human needs has created situations of inevitable and massive internal instability.

We must ask, Mr. President: Is this intelligent strategy or is it simply Parkinson's law with a vengeance? Is any member of this body familiar with even one government which, having requested military aid, was refused it on the grounds that there was no clear connection with our defense? Surely, Mr. President, there must be

one nation somewhere in this world which seeks military aid but whose relationship to our defense is so remote that it does not warrant the expenditure of millions of dollars of tax-payers' fund for equipping its armed forces.

We must ask, Mr. President: Have we underwritten our own security by this process? Or have we undermined our security by a wholesale and indiscriminate commitment of the prestige and resources of this nation in this obscure land or that which may come within the eager reach of bureaucracy?

These questions should indeed bring concern in the Senate. They give striking cause for concern when we consider them, specifically, in connection with the situation in Laos. I have some first-hand familiarity with that situation, Mr. President. I was there when in 1953 there were only two American officials in the entire country. I watched the haphazard wholesale bureaucratic involvement, not of one agency but of several, deepen over the years. I urged time and again against this course. But the bureaucracy grew and the millions of dollars in grants multiplied in 1955, '56, '57, '58, '59 and '60. This growth helped to tighten the noose around an effective policy. It helped to smother the possibility of a sensible diplomacy of limited contact with this remote situation by involving this nation ever more deeply in Laotian internal affairs. We gave Laotian leaders labels--some correct, some incorrect--and then became obsessed with the labels we

gave them. And now, seven years later, after the steady flow of thousands of civilian and military officials, after the parade of private contractors building this or that at millions of dollars of cost, after the pilgrimage of inspectors, consultants and what-not, more than three-hundred-and-fifty millions of dollars of the tax-money of the American people later, we are back to diplomacy in Geneva in an effort to find a solution to this situation which has become far more difficult to deal with than it was when the involvement began.

And should the Senate not be concerned, Mr. President, by the events in Korea? Can we feel anything else but concern when we recall the great sacrifices of Americans, Koreans and others to keep South Korea free and see now where we have arrived? It is eight years after these great human losses culminated in the truce in 1953. It is \$4 billion dollars in grants after the truce in South Korea.

What has been wrought by this immense effort, Mr. President? We must ask that question. We can no longer sweep the doubts under the rug. We cannot take umbrage in shifting the responsibility elsewhere. For if there is any area in the world where our influence, the influence of the aid-program has been immense and overwhelming it has been South Korea during the last 7 or 8 years.

We know what was achieved by the conflict, Mr. President; the hope of freedom was kept alive in South Korea. But what has been

done with the years since this achievement?

What has been wrought, Mr. President, out of the billions of aid since the truce? We must ask that question, even though the Communists are poised across the border at the 38th parallel. It is no answer to say that in a critical situation of this kind or in Laos or in others, the less said the better and then go on in the same pattern. We cannot accept silence on these burning questions. We cannot ignore these matters any longer.

There are grave risks, Mr. President, in speaking out at a time of confrontation with the Communists in Korea no less than elsewhere, but the gravest risk of all is to find in this confrontation an excuse for not examining and correcting our own shortcomings.

Korea has revealed a dangerous pattern into which the aid-process is interwoven in certain underdeveloped nations. The pattern, is this, Mr. President: poverty and want--instability--Communist or other pressures--U. S. aid--public corruption--weak civilian government--the response of military dictatorship.

The pattern is stark and clear in Korea but its applicability is by no means confined to that buffeted nation. We will ignore the implications of that pattern only at our own peril, only at great cost in wasted aid, only at the risk of repeated blows to the stature, the dignity and ultimately the safety of this nation. I say to this Senate,

that if the only answer that freedom can give to communism is the dead-end of military junta then we have given no answer at all. And it borders on the disgraceful to suggest in the land of the Declaration of Independence, and the Constitution, in a land which fought through World War II, without doing violence to the rights of its citizens, that this is the only answer which can be given.

For a moment in historic time, the last-ditch device of military dictatorship may give a respite from both the threat of communism and frustration with the complexities of freedom but the tide of history will not wait much longer than that moment. No matter how grim the circumstances, we will either divorce ourselves from or change this pattern, of which the aid-program has become an interwoven element, or we will face the gravest of consequences in the years ahead. The answer to communism is responsible freedom and not some other form of tyranny in the name of anti-communism or any other ism. If we are to use the device of foreign aid at all, we had better see to it that those who administer it understand that elementary truth.

Let me make clear, Mr. President, that I do not mean every nation receiving aid must reproduce the forms of freedom which have evolved in this nation or Western Europe. But there are certain fundamentals of freedom which cannot be ignored without robbing the word of its meaning. There must be the expressed consent of those governed and

the right of peaceful dissent. There must be respect and safeguards for the dignity of the human personality. Where these do not exist, freedom does not exist, and in these situations, the aid-program treads on dangerous grounds, particularly in its massive military and economic aspects, regardless of how worthy may be its objectives.

Mr. President, I could go on in this vein, citing case after case for concern with the aid-program. I could note this road-project or that, crumpling in some obscure country a year or two after millions were spent to complete it. I could refer to evidences of unbridled incompetence or extravagance, of improper practices, of expensive experts piled on expensive experts--scurrying back and forth and producing unused reports flowing in an endless stream to files and storage warehouses, of any number of other specific and expensive faults.

Errors of this kind can be made in foreign aid, Mr. President, some excusable, some inexcusable. I daresay that in this respect, the agency which administers the aid-program has not been much different than a score of others and under far more difficult circumstances. But these errors, Mr. President, do not go to the heart of the matter as it confronts the Senate.

The heart of the matter is that foreign aid cannot be terminated abruptly without producing the most catastrophic consequences for this nation. And the heart of the matter, too, is that foreign aid must change

or, in the end it may still produce catastrophnic consequences for this nation.

Time is running out, Mr. President, in which to convert this program into ~~an~~ certain asset for freedom and for the security of this nation.

It seems to me that we shall have a better chance, perhaps a last chance, to bring about this conversion if we grasp, now, at the beginning of a new Administration, some of the lines of essential alteration. Indeed, changes of this nature are suggested in the President's message and the Committee's report. If I may summarize and elaborate, I would suggest that the revision of this program needs be built on these premises:

(1) Aid Grants--as distinct from loans or Point IV technical assistance--ought to be most carefully used as a direct supplement of our foreign policies. We must seek constantly, through diplomatic initiatives, the adjustment of this nation's role in and relations with changing and evolving parts of the world, adjustments which will permit a reduction in grants of military and economic aid, without jeopardizing peace or security. We must not rest content with any existing situation whose stability is heavily dependent on the indefinite continuance of this form of assistance from the United States.

(2) Military aid must shrink in orderly fashion until it becomes again what it was originally intended to be, a direct and vital strategic link in the military defense of this nation. Except in these terms, it seems to me that this program rests on most tenuous grounds. We must, indeed, question whether it is in our interests or in the interests of the people of recipient countries if this aid serves only vaguely as a link in our defense and very specifically as an instrument for promoting internal stability in other lands.

In short, what I am suggesting, Mr. President, is that we must actively discourage, not encourage, other governments from seeking or depending upon military aid from this nation. This aid should be extended with the greatest reluctance and caution and not with an eagerness ^{to} plunge this nation into the internal affairs of others. I know there is risk in this course. This country or that may fall to a government which is Communist or otherwise antagonistic towards us. But it ought to be clear by now ^{that} risk remains even if we do supply military aid, as witness Cuba, Viet Nam, and Laos.

Governments which do not meet the reasonable needs of their peoples cannot long endure. If they fall, the consequences to this nation, are likely to be far more adverse in those countries which have been supplied with significant military aid than in those which have not.

(3) Where we are deeply immersed in supplying grants of economic or supportin g aid of one kind or another, year in and year out, we must act to reduce and end this dependency, not in a day, not in a year but as rapidly as possible. This is partly the task of creative diplomacy, as I have already indicated. But it is also the task of a wise, dedicated and indefatigable administration of the aid - program itself, with the object of ending the dependency. We must develop, together with recipient nations, clear-cut, finate and definable objectives for grants of aid. We must insist upon sacrifices on the part of those who can make them in the recipient nations, sacrifices which match those of our own people who foot the bill for aid. We must develop plans of action which induce an ever-increasing input of initiative and effort on the part of recipients and a steady reduction in aid-grants on the part of this~~e~~ nation.

(4) We must re-examine the present complex of what are the small and essentially altruistic expressions of the aid-program, namely, our large contributions to the total funds for the United Nations technical assistance and related activities, the Point IV Technical Assistance Program and the new Peace Corps concept. All of these efforts have great merit in themselves but one would hope, Mr. President, that we shall make certain that we use to best advantage the tens of millions of dollars that flow through these separate channels in terms of maximum advantage to the nations into which they flow and, in terms

of long-range goodwill. If there is one part of the aid-program which should act to kindle warm, human, friendly contact between the people of this nation and people elsewhere, it is this type of activity.

(5) In our own interests as well as in the interestsof peace we must encourage and welcome the widest possible international participation in assisting underdeveloped nations to move forward more rapidly in economic and social progress. We are trying to do that, of course, with respect to Western Europe. But there is room for more giving in some of the nations of that region. Indeed there is room for more giving on the part of nations everywhere.

In this connection, it should be noted that there was a time, not very long ago, when the mere prospect of Soviet assistance to non-communist countries was viewed as little short of disastrous on the part of those who administered our own aid-affairs. The Congress was spurred to appropriations for the aid-program on the grounds that we had to compete with the Russians in this process. Yet the Russians have given aid to India. They have given aid to Egypt and elsewhere and the world has not collapsed in any of these places. Indeed, there seems to be even a measure of correlation between the presence of Soviet aid-administrators in, and the improvement of our relations with, certain nations in Asia and Africa.

It seems to me utterly essential that the people of this nation not be pressured into larger appropriations for the aid-program by this

tactic. The tactic not only undoes much of the intrinsic worth of the program by giving it a motivation which is transparent even to children, but it places this nation in the position of being pressured into ever larger grants of aid.

We must do what must be done in foreign aid, not on the basis of a competition with the Soviet Union to see who can get there first with the most wide-open hand. We must do what must be done on the basis of what reasonably serves the interests of the people of this nation and the people of recipient nations, what serves freedom and peace. Other nations must act as they see fit. If they believe it really serves their interests to accept Soviet aid and they get it, I see no cause for panic on our part.

These observations would seem to be so elementary as not to require discussion in the Senate. Yet, it is evident that much that is elementary needs discussing if this program is to be improved.

(6) Finally, Mr. President, grants of military and economic aid, particularly, must be administered as instruments of foreign relations on the basis of policies determined first and last by the President and the Secretary of State. Our diplomacy must be free to, and must be spurred to seek to reduce the need for this aid. It must cease to serve as a kind of spearhead or errand boy for the introduction of this type of assistance into more and more nations.

Within the administrative structure of the aid program itself there must be a complete overhaul of concepts, techniques, and, if necessary, of personnel in order to make certain that the program does become a controlled instrument of policy in fact as well as in words. And, finally, if aid is to be an effective instrument, there must be a vast simplification and streamlining of the administrative processes themselves.

Mr. President, in my opinion, changes along these basic lines must be achieved and they must be achieved promptly. Our security is at stake. Our stature as a responsible and prudent nation is at stake. Prevention of the waste of enormous amounts of public funds is at stake.

Some may inquire, then, why should the Senate ^{have} not ~~act~~ now to save more of these funds by cutting the authorization reported by the Committee? And indeed, why should the Senate ^{have} not ~~proceed~~ on the Floor to write into law these basic changes which I have been discussing?

I revert to what I said at the outset of my remarks. I am satisfied, Mr. President, ^{, generally,} that ~~what~~ the Foreign Relations Committee has done with this bill constitutes what can be prudently and wisely done by legislative action at this time. I would not hesitate to accept the combined judgment of that group of men against any other, including the past or present administrators of this program, as to what

legislation will be most useful. Their year-in, year-out consideration of this measure has given them an understanding and knowledge of aid *programs* which is unexcelled in this body or in this government.

The balance of the task of alteration, as I see it, Mr. President, must be carried out by the President and the Administration. With a new President and a new Administration, the opportunity for constructive change does exist. The president is prepared and determined to do the job that must be done. It is essential that he have every reasonable opportunity to do it. If Senators--regardless of party--desire that this program be altered, as, clearly, it must be altered, if Senators desire that significant amounts of public funds be saved in the years ahead, without jeopardy to the nation's security and interests, they will support this bill, ~~as it has emerged from Committee.~~

Mr. President, I have spoken, today, at great length and with the utmost frankness. I hope that in doing so I have not given personal offense to anyone in the Senate, the Administration or in friendly nations abroad. Certainly that was not my intention. But there comes a time, Mr. President, when it is necessary to risk misunderstanding in order to further a greater understanding, when facing facts must take precedent over saving face. That time, I believe, is now, for the foreign aid program.